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INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS UNDER UNCERTAINTY
di—
certainty),I.Introduction
The theory of international trade has been extended in recent years to
incorporate uncertain trading environments. The early writers in this area (e.g.
Kemp and Liviatan (1973), Turnovsky (1974) and Batra (1975)) argued that the in-
troduction of randomness into the standard determiListic models had proven to be
very damaging to many orthodox results, including those concerning the pattern
of trade. However, as Helpman and Razin (l978a, l978b) later showed, many of the
negative findings were due to the implicity assumed absence of markets for inter-
national risk sharing in those early models. When international trade in equities
is admitted as a possibility, a number of the familiar theorems are restored.
Under such conditions, if uncertainty takes the form of industry—specific (but
not country—specific) multiplicative technological shift factors, and if certain
restrictions are placed on agents' utility functions, then, as Anderson (1981)
has shown, the usual comparative cost considerations re—emerge as the determinants
of the pattern of trade in securities Trade in commodities may also be pre-
dicted by the cost—based (i.e. Ricardian and Heckscher—Ohlin) theorems, at least
in an "on average" sense.
International movements of physical capital, even more so than the flow of
goods, may be influenced by the existence of technological uncertainty. The
worldwide allocation of capital takes place largely before the resolution of un-
certainty, and is motivated by, among other factors, the desire on the part of
risk—averse agents to hedge against risk. Capital flows not only into those
sectors and countries where its expected marginal product is high, but also into
those which singly or together provide investors with a relatively stable pattern
of income across states of nature.—2—
In this paper, we study the interrelationship between international capital
movements and international trade in securities under conditions of technological
uncertainty. The problem takes on greatest interest under the assumption that
random disturbances in an industry are not perfectl:y correlated across countries.
Interestingly, the existence of such uncertainty introduces some fundamentally
new elements into the determination of the direction and level of capital move—
ments. Essentially, the general equilibrium supply functions for real equities
derive from the familiar supply relationships. But the demands for equities also
have an important qualitative effect on the equilibrium allocation of resources,
even when all individuals in both countries have identical andhoinethetic tastes
for goods and assets.
We begin, in the next section, with a model in the spirit of MacDougall(1960).
In addition to the usual influence of the autarky factor—endowment ratios, we
find an important role for the relative sizes of the labor forces and for the
distributions of the random technology variables, in the determination of the
volume and direction of capital movements. Indeed, capital may flow tothe re-
latively capital—abundant country, even if the risks in the twocountries are
entirely symmetrical.
In Section III, we extend the model to include an internationally—traded
safe asset, i.e. a traded bond. Under a restriction on the utilityfunctions
that is analogous to that needed to prove the Heckscher—Ohlin theorem(i.e. inter-
nationally identical and homothetic tastes for goods and assets),the introduction
of the bond market does not alter the conclusions of Section II.
Finally, in Section IV, we investigate a two—good variant, adoptingthe
framework of the Heckscher—Ohlin model. Whereas the nonrandoni modelis character-
ized by perfect substitution between commodity trade and factor movements(see—3—
Mundell, 1957), and therefore by an indeterminacy in the level and direction of
goods trade and capital movements, the equilibrium conditions under uncertainty
determine nontrivially the volumes of all these flows (as well as trade in
securities).2 Under the assumption thattechnology in one of the industries in
each country is nonstochastic, we are able to identify the separate roles of the
relative sizes of the two labor forces and the relative factor intensities of the
two industries in the determination of the direction of physical capital movements.
Our results are summarized in a concluding section.
II. The MacDougall Model with Uncertainty
The simplest model in which capital movements can be analyzed is one with two
countries, one good and two factors. MacDougall (1960) developed such a model to
study the welfare implications of capital movements in a deterministic world under
a variety of assumptions about technology, the behavior of labor, market structure
and tax policy.
In this paper, we are interested only in the positive implications of the
simplest variant of the MacDougali formulation (i.e. constant—returns—to—scale
production functions, fixed labor supplies, perfect competition and laissez—faire).
In this case, equilibrium is characterized by equalization of the marginal products
of capital in the two countries. Such an equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1,
where the horizontal dimension of the box represents the fixed world endowment of
capital, and the marginal product of capital as a function of the capital allo-
cated to the home (foreign) country is plotted *ith respect to the origin at the
left (right) of the figure. The equilibrium allocation is at E, whileA1 and
A2 are two possible autarky allocations. At A1, the marginal product of capital
at home exceeds that in the foreign country, whereas the opposite is true at A2.—4—
Suppose production functions are the same in the two countries, Then A1 must
be characterized by a higher capital—to—labor ratio abroad than at home, and A2
by the reverse situation. Evidently, if technologies are the same and nonrandom,
capital flows to the country which, in autarky, has a greater relative abundance
of labor.
We begin our analysis of capital movements under uncertainty by introducing
technological randomness into each of the countries of the MacDougall model, and
allowing for international trade in equities in the manner of Helpman and Razin.
Let the S possible states of nature be indexed by c,
c'.l,2,..,,S.
Each state of nature is defined by the realization of two country—specific random
variables, 8(cz) and 6*(c), corresponding to the state of technology in the
home and foreign industries, respectively.3 The output of the home—country
firm in state ctis
X(ct) =O(a)F(L.,I()
for cz =1,2,...,S;j =
whereF is a standard, constant—returns—to—scale production function (the same
for all firms), L is the firm's labor input and K is its input of physical
capital. Similarly the output of the foreign firminstate ciis given by
=
O*(c*)F(L,K)
for c =l,2,...,S;j =l,2,...,J*.
The production function for foreign firms is identical to that for home firms,
but the multiplicative uncertainty term, which is the same for all firms within
each country, is not necessarily the same for firms located in different countries.
With these assumptions, firms in each country can be aggregated to the industry
level, so that henceforth we omit the jsubscripts,—5--
Firms in each country choose their inputs prior to the resolution of un-
certainty so as to maximize their net stock market values (i.e. gross values
less factor payments). Let q and q* be the prices of a unit of real equity
in a representative home and foreign firm, respectively, with q E1by choice
of numeraire. A unit of real equity in a home firm pays 0(a) units of the
(single) consumption good if state a is realized. Similarly, 0*(cz)is the
return to a unit of the foreign equity. Home and foreign firms produce
Z =F(L,K) and Z* =F(L*,K*) units of real equities, respectively, which
have gross stock market values of F(L, K) and q*F(L*, K*). Thus, the home
country industry chooses L and K to maximize F(L, K) —wL—rK,where w
is the home wage rate and r the home rental rate for capital, both expressed
in terms of home equities. The first—order conditions for maximization are
FL(L, K) =w (1)
FK(L, K) =r (2)
The foreign industry seeks to maximize q*F(L*, K*) —w*L*—r*K*,and thus
chooses L* and K* to satisfy
q*F(L*, K*) =w* (3)
q*F(L*, K*) =r* (4)
Capital and labor endowments in the home and foreign countries are K and
K* respectively, and labor endowments are L and L*.Labor is internationally




Capital movements are costless and unrestricted, which implies the existenceof




We turn finally to consumer behavior. Consumer—investors in each country
are endowed with physical capital, labor and shares of ownershipin firms. Prior
to the resolution of uncertainty, each individual sells his factor endowments,
bears his fraction of each firm's factor costs in accordance with hisinitial
ownership, and buys and sells shares of stock in the various firms.
Let V[ 11(a)] be the concave, von Neumann —Norgenstern(indirect) utility
function for individual i, where I1(c) is the individual's incomein state a.
Suppose the individual were to hold in his ultimate portfolioz1 shares of
stock in home firms and z1 shares in foreign firms. Then his incomein state
a would be
I1(c) =O(ct)z1+ O*(c)z*i
The portfolio choice problem of this individual is to maximize expected utility,
EV1[ Ii(cl)],given(common) subjective beliefs about the probability distribution
for the states of nature, and subject to the budget constraintthat the cost of
his portfolio not exceed the value of his initial endowment.The portfolio al-




where V() is the marginal utility of income.
The model is closed by the world market—clearing conditions for the real




where the summation is over all individuals in the world.
Before proceeding to an investigation of the properties of the cum—factor
movements equilibrium, we choose to place a restriction on the form of the
utility functions that is analagous to the one often invoked in nonstochastic
trade models for proofs of theorems on the determinants of commodity trade. In
the present context, the assumption is that all consumers, worldwide, have
identIcal and homothetic preferences over equities. The purpose of this assump-
tion is to neutralize any bias in the pattern of trade In securities or in the
direction of capital movements introduced on the demand side by differences in
tastes or by income distributionalconsiderations.4
For consumers' preferences over securities to be identical and homothetic,
it is sufficient that they all have utility functions that exhibit identical
and constant relative aversion to income risk; i.e., that their utility functions
be of the form v(.) =(11)l'Y'/(1—1),for some I1, or of the form





(where z*h/z1), from which it is clear that the relative holdings of the
two stocks in any investor's portfolio is independent of his nationality or
level of wealth.
Identical, homothetic preferences have the property of being aggregable.
That is, world demand for assets can be consistently represented by a set of
community asset indifferences curves of the form EV[0(a)z + 0*(ct)z*1 =V.
These also represent demands in each country taken separately. Utility is a
quasi—concave function of asset holdings, and is strictly so, ifindividuals
are risk averse (i.e. V11 <0),and if 0(a) and 0*(a) are less—than—
perfectly correlated.
The nature of the world equilibrium with free capital movements is best
understood with the aid of Figure 2. For illustrative purposes, we depict a
situation in which 0(a) and 0*(ct) have symmetricaldistributions.5 In
quadrants II and IV, we draw the production functions forreal equities in
each country, as a function of the amount of capital located there. The sumof
the allocations of capital to the two countries is constrained by equation(7)
to be equal to the exogenous world supply. This constraint is represented by
a straight line with slope of negative one, in quadrant III,Together, these
constraints trace out, in quadrant IV, a world transformation locus, TT',
relating the feasible supplies of the two real equities.Each point on the
frontier corresponds to a particular division of capital betweenthe two
countries. The slope of the transformation curve at any point is given by
—
FK(L*,K*)/FK(L, K).—9—
A representative of the family of homothetic asset indifference curves is
depicted in quadrant IV by VV'.The slope of VV' is given by (the negative
of) the marginal rate of substitution of assets, i.e. by the left hand side of
equation (9). Under the assumption that O(c) and O*(c) are symmetrically
distributed, the slope of VV' must be a negative one where z =z.
World equilibrium occurs at E, the point of tangency of an asset indif-
ference curve and the world transformation locus. This is because consumers set (the
negative of) the marginal rate of substitution between assets (MRSA) equal to
the relative price of securities, in equation (9), while competition in the world
market for physical capital leads to equality between (the negative of) the marginal
rate of transformation (MRTA) and the relative price of securities, by equations
(2), (4) and (8).
In the diagram, the deterministic equilibrium or "MacDougall point" is labelled
M. As we have noted, the deterministic equilibrium is characterized by
FK(L, K) =FK(L*,K*), so the marginal rate of transformation at N is negative
one. By the concavity of the asset indifference curve, and the fact that the
latter has a slope of negative one at point D, it follows that equilibrium with
uncertainty must lie (weakly) between the MacDougall point and the 45° line;
i.e., it must exhibit more diversification. If agents are risk neutral, or if
O and Q* are perfectly correlated, then the asset indifference curves are
straight lines with slopes of negative one, and the two equilibria coincide at
N. Alternatively, if L =L*,the NRTA is negative one at the 45° line, and
again the equilibria coincide. In all other cases, the equilibrium under un-
certainty differs from that for the case of no uncertainty by an amount that
depends upon the degree of relative risk aversion and the correlation between
disturbances in the two countries. A higher degree of relative risk aversion— 10—
anda less positive (or more negative) correlation between 0(a) and 8*(a)
tend to render the asset indifference curves more concave, and thus contribute
to a larger distance between points N and E in the figure.
The introduction of uncertainty may alter the nature of the capital—movements
equilibrium either quantitatively or qualitatively. Consider the three potential
autarky points at A1, A2 and A3. (Autarky production is represented by the
point along TT' that corresponds to the exogenously given initial endowment,
at, for example, a1, a2 or a3),If autarky production is at A1, then in both
the deterministic model and the model with uncertainty the home country imports
capital, but mOre capital movement takes place in the latter case. With autarky
at A2, capital flows out of the home country in both situations, but nowthe
introduction of uncertainty lessens the extent of capital movement. Finally,
if autarky is at A3, the introduction of uncertainty reverses the direction
of capital movement, relative to the outcome in a deterministic world.
What can be said in general about the direction of capital movement in a
one—good world with uncertainty and international trade in securities? In order
to isolate the separate influences of the relative size of the labor forces, the
relative factor abundances, and the relative riskiness of the two countries,
we consider, in turn, initial situations that deviate from complete symmetry
along only one of these dimentions. Our findings are summarized in three
propositions.
Proposition 1: If 0(a) and 0*(a) have symmetric distributions, and L =L*,
then physical capital moves toward the country with the smaller autarky endowment
of capital.— 11—
Proof:The symmetry of the distributions of e(a) and O*(a) implies that
the MRSA is negative one for z =z The equality of labor forces implies
that the MRTA is negative one for Z =Z*.T1us, an equal division of the
world's capital stock across countries (K =K*)satisfies all the conditions
for equilibrium. Also, equilibrium is unique, so capital must flow from the
country in which it is initially abundant toward the less—well—endowed country.
Proposition 2:If S(o) and O*(ci) have symmetric distributions, and
K/L =K*/L*,then physical capital moves toward the country with the smaller
labor force.
Proof: If L is greater (less) then L*, the autarky point lies along TT'
above (below) the point where Z =Z*.The MRTA is negative one at the
autarky point (recall that MRTA =— FK(L*,K*)/FK(L, K), and that F is
homogeneous of degree one) and decreases monotonically for movements downward
along TT'.The slope of the asset indifference curve that intersects TT'
is negative one at the point where Z =Z*,and increases monotonically for
movements downward along the transformation locus. It follows that equilibrium
must lie on TT' between the autarky point and the point where Z =Z*.In
equilibrium, there is more production of the real equity of the initially
smaller country than there is in autarky, i.e. capital moves toward the country
with the smaller labor force.
Proposition 3:If K =K*and L =L*,and the distribution of the random
variable in one country is riskier than the distribution in the other country
(in the sense of a mean—preserving spread), then capital moves toward the less
risky country.- 12-
Proof:For definiteness, suppose that the distribution of 0*(a) is riskier
than the distribution of 0(a).Then, 0*(a) =*(a)+ E(a), where 0(a)
and have setric distributions, and EEc(a)I*(a)] =E[c(a)l0(a)]=o.6
The asset indifference curve which intersects TT' at the point where Z =Z*
has slope given in (9') by
E(*(cx) + £(a))V1[0(a)+ *(a)+ s(cx)] E E(a)V1[0(a) + + c(ci)]
—
EO(a)V1[0(a) + *(a) + (a)] E0(a)V1[0(a)+ *(a)+ c(a)] '
where this equality follows from that fact that 0(a) and '*(a) are sm—
metrically distributed, and each is independent of E(c).The second term in
the brackets is negative, since s(a) and V1() have negative covariance.
Thus, the asset indifference curve has slope greater than negative one at z =z,
while the slope of TT' is equal to negative one there. It follows that eouil—
ibrium is at a point above the 45° line, i.e. that capital moves to the less
risky country.
En general situations, the direction of capital movement is determined by
the interaction of the separate influences of relative country size, relative
factor abundance and relative country riskiness. However, the nature of this
interaction can be quite complex. It is not true, for example, that an increase
in the riskiness of one country (in a mean—preserving spread sense) will always
cause capital to flow out of that country. If the country thatbecomes more
risky also has a smaller labor force, and if the disturbances inthe two countries
are negatively correlated, then the increase in riskiness makesthe real equity
of that country a more attractive asset, Intuitively, the extra incomethe
asset provides when the marginal utility of income is high outweighsthe utility
cost of the income forgone when marginal utility is low. One general statement— 13—
thatcan be made is that ceteris paribus, more capital will flow into a country
the smaller is its labor force. The desire for diversification on the part of
consumer—investors implies a tendency for real equity supplies to be equalized.
III. The MacDougall Model with a Traded Bond
In the previous section we studied capital movements in a one—good model
with uncertainty, where the only assets available to consumer—investors were
risky real equities. In the present section, we extend the analysis to incorp-
orate a market for a safe asset (i.e., an internationally traded bond), while
maintaining all of our earlier assumptions, including especially the one re-
stricting agents' asset preferences to be identical and homothetic, We will
show that this extension does not alter any of the conclusions of the previous
section.
Let bi be the holding of an internationally traded bond, with price
by the th individual. This asset pays a return of one unit of the consumption
good in all states of nature. The consumer—investor must allocate his ex ante
wealth over three assets, the two real equities, and the bond. The first—order
conditions for expected utility maximization imply, in place of equation (9),
the following equations:
E e*(c)V1EO(c)z1 + O*(a)z*i + b1]
• •q* (12)
E O(c)V1[O(c)z1 + O*(c)z*1 + b1]
E V [e(c)z1+ O*(c)z*1+bi] I
• . (13)
EO(c)V1[O()z. + O*(c)z*' + b1]
The bond—market clearing condition is
b'=O (14)
1
All of the remaining equilibrium conditions of the earlier set—up continue to apply.— 14—
Thefact that all individuals have identical and homethetic demands for
assets implies that, in equilibrium, each will allocate the same fraction of
his wealth to any given asset. If the equilibrium bond—holding of one mdi—
vidua:L is either strictly positive or strictly 1?gative, such would also be
true for every other individual. In either case, equation (14) could not be
satisfied. It follows that in equilibrium, b' =0,for all i.Once this
fact is recognized, it is clear that the asset holdings that satisfy equation
(9) will also satisfy equation (12). Indeed, all the conditions of the capital...
movements equilibrium in the absence of bond trading are also consistent with
equilibrium when a bond market is assumed to exist. Equation (13), then, serves
to determine the price of bonds such that in equilibrium all agents choose to
take a net position of zero in the market for this safe assetq We summarize
this finding in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: When all agents have identical, homothetic, assets utility
functions, the equilibrium allocation of resources with free capitalmovements
and free trade in equities and an "inside" bond is identical to the equilibrium
allocation when the bond market does not exist.
IV. The Heckscher—Ohlin—Mundell 11odel with Uncertainty
In a deterministic world with two goods and two factors, internationaltrade
in goods and international factor movements are perfect substitutes, provided
that both countries are incompletely specialized in the ultimate equilibrium
(see Nundell, 1957). In other words, the factor price equalizationtheorem
implies that if capital movements are allowed, startingfrom an equilibrium
with free trade in goods, no movements are actually needed tomaintain equili-
brium.7— 15—
Inthe present section we extend the model of Section II to incorporate a
second consumption good, and therefore a second security, in each country. The
resulting model is a cum—uncertainty analogue of the deterministic Heckscher—
Ohlin model with free capital movements. In contrast to the results of Nunclell
for the nonrandom case, we find that goods trade is not a perfect substitute
for factor movements, and that equilibrium generally involves transactions in
both international markets in determinate amounts. The reason for this difference
is that without uncertainty, the location of production of a good is immaterial;
with uncertainty, the location of production is economically relevant when
equities are imperfect substitutes, We assume that two goods are produced in
each country with capital and labor, and adopt completely the I-ieckscher—Ohlin
production structure with regard to real equity outputs. As before, the output
of one of the goods (good 1) is stochastic and is given by X =eF(L, in
the home country and X =0*F(L, K*) in the foreign country. The outputs
of real equities in this industry are once again denoted Z and Z, with
equity prices q( 1) and q.
For simplicity, assume that the technology for the second good is nonstochastic.
Then the outputs of real equities in this industry are identically equal to the
outputs of good 2, and are related to factor inputs by Y =G(LK) and
=G(L,K'). Shares of stock in firms in industry 2 are perfect substitutes,
irrespective of country of location. Let q denote the common equity price
for shares of firms in this industry, measured relative to the price of the home—
country real equities of industry 1. Finally, let p(c) be the relative price
of good 1 in terms of good 2 in state of nature c.— 16—
Asis known from the works of Helpman and Razin, the conditions for pro-
duction equilibrium are the same as those in the standard Heckscher—Ohlin model,
except that real equity prices substitutehere for commodity prices.Of course,
with capital internationally mobile, there is the additional condition that the
rental rates for capital be equalized across countries. As in the determinIstic
model, an equilibrium with incomplete specialization in each country will turn
out to be possible, so long as the ultimate factor endowment ratios are not"too
disparate. Since capital is freely mobile, this implies only acondition on
the comparative sizes of the two labor forces. We will concentrate our attention
on those situations where an equilibrium with incomplete specializationis pos—
sib 1 e.
Consider now the optimization problem of the typical consumer—investor.
This individual wishes to maximize the mathematical expectation of his ex post
utility, defined over his levels of consumption of the two goods,c(cz) and
Let u[ c1(c), c1(c)] represent his ex post utility function.
Anderson (1981) has shown that, to ensure that all individuals haveidentical
homethetic commodity and equity preferences, it is necessary and sufficientto
restrict the form of U(,) to be any linear transform of a positive power
function (of the same degree for all individuals) of a homogeneous, quasi—
concave function (also identical for all individuals).
The individual's maximization can be thought of as consistingof two
stages. After the uncertainty is resolved,the individual gconsumerwho
holds a portfolio of zi shares of firms in the home industry 1.z* shares
firms in the foreign industry 1, and y1 shares of firms in industry2 in
either country has income
8
=O()p(a)z1+ O*()p(a)z* + y.- 17-
Heallocates this income to maximize ex post utility according to the familiar
condition
i I





The solution to this second stage problem can be used to define an indirect
utility function, V[p(a), 11(a)]
In the first stage (i.e. prior to the resolution of uncertainty), the
individual qua investor sells his initial endowment and allocates the proceeds
among the three assets to maximize EVIp(a), 11(a)] .Weassume that price
expectations are formed rationally at this stage. Let = and
y1 1/z- Then the first—order conditions for expected—utility maximization
imply.
E{O*(a)p(a)V1[p(a), O(a)p(a) +U*(a)p(a)+ y]}
=q* (15)
E{8(a)p(a)V1[p(ci), e(a)p(cz)+ O*(a)p(a)'+ ']} X
E{V1[p(cz),O(a)p(a) + O*(a)p(a) + yI}
=q (16)
E{O(a)p(cz)V1Ep(a), e(a)p(a)+ O(a)p(a)+]}
wherethe fact that asset perferences are identical and homothetic allows us to
drop the i superscripts.
The model is closed, as before, by market—clearing conditions for assets
(e.g., y1 =Y+Y*, z. =Z,etc.). These are augmented now by ax post
I ii
market—clearingconditions state—by—state for each of the goods
(i.e., c1(cz), =X(a)+ X*(a) and E c1(cz)=Y+ Y*).— 18—
Wewill henceforth restrict our investigation to situationswhere the
distributions of the country—specific random variables are symmetric(though
not perfectly correlated). Our strategy will be toconstruct a candidate
equilibrium based on the assumption that productionof real equities is in-
completely specialized in each country, and then toshow that, as long as L
and L* are not too disparate, no feasibility conditions areviolated by this
candidate equilibrium. Provided that agents are risk averse,that O(ct) and
O*(c) are not perfectly correlated, and that an equilibriumwith incomplete
specialization exists, the constructed equilibriumis the only possible equili-
brium.9
Consider first the ex post relative commodity price thatis realized in
state of nature c. By the homotheticityof aggregate demands, this market—
clearing price is a function only of therelative outputs of the two goods,
i.e. p() =TIE(O()Z + e*()Z*)/(Y + y*)]
In the ex ante equilIbrium, incomplete specializationin each country and
rental rate equalization implies that the relative
security—price ratio that
governs resource allocation inthe home country, q, must equal the relative
security—price ratio in the foreign country, q/q.Evidently, in an equili-
brium with incomplete specialization, q =1.
Next consider equation (15). In equilibrium,'= Z/Z. Substituting
equilibrium values for p(cz), and q*,it should be clear that (15) is
satisfied if (and only if) Z =Z*.This is because, when Z =Z*,ri(') Is
symmetric in O(c) and e*(c),asis V1().Since, by assumption, 0(a) and
8*(cx) have symmetric distributions, the marginalrate of asset substitution— 19—
betweenthe two industry 1 securities is equal to one. The construction of
equilibrium is completed by the choice of a 2(Y + Y*)/(Z ÷ Z*) and a q
that are feasible, and that simultaneously satisfy (16) and the net—stock—
market—value maximization (i.e. asset supply) conditJons.10
It remains only to show that such a choice is possible. Suppose first
that L =L*.Then an equal allocation of capital across countries will ensure
that Z =Zfor any choice of q. It is easy then to check that, if both
goods are essential, there must exist some choice of qthat clears the world
equity markets. Now, the fact that U(,.) is strictly concave implies that
the endogenous variables of the model are all continuous functions of the exo-
genous parameters. In particular, for a sufficiently small change in either
L or L*, holding the other constant, the world equilibrium must continue to
be characterized by incomplete specialization in each country.
The key property of an incomplete—specialization equilibrium that we will
exploit in our investigation of the determinants of the direction of capital
movements is the one requiring equalization of absolute levels of the output
of the real equity of industry 1 across countries. There is, of course, rio such
requirement for outputs of good 1 in the two countries of a deterministic
model. The difference arises because, whereas the outputs of the first industry
(i.e. good one) are perfect substitutes in a nonstochastic world, they no longer
are so when what firms produce are real equities in a world of uncertainty. As
will become evident in the course of our discussion, this difference explains
why factor movements do not of necessity occur under certainty, given free
trade in goods, but do generally occur with uncertainty.
As before, let us proceed by considering in turn cases which deviate from
perfect symmetry between countries along only one dimension. First, we have:— 20—
Proposition5: If O(c) and O*(c) are symmetrically distributed and r=
capitalmoves toward the country with the smaller endowment of capital, That
country has positive expected exports of both goods. The ratio of its expected
exports is equal to the ratio of its expected consumption levels,
Proof: With L =11*,the equilibrium conditions Z =Zand q* =1(which
hold for an incomplete—specialization equilibrium) can only be satisfied if
K + K =K*+ K*, i.e. if the world's capital stock is equally allocated across
countries. Thus, capital must move toward the country which has the smaller
endowment.
Consider now the pattern of ex post goods trade. Let ch(a) and c(c)
be the aggregate consumption levels of good h (h =x,y) in the home and foreign
country,in state ct.For definiteness, assume that K >, anddefine
X [(wt+ ri)/wr* + riJ —1.Ais the percent excess of home endowment
wealth over foreign endowment wealth.11 The homotheticity of commodity prefer-
ences implies that a.(a) =(1+ A)c(c).Since ex post factor allocations are
equal, Y == [Ec(c)+ Ec*(c)]/2 and EX(ct) =EX*(o)=[E(a) + Fc(a)]/2.
Expected exports of good 2 by the foreign countryare12
XE c (a)
—Ec(a)= > 0,
Its expected exports of good 1 are
* AEc(a)
EX*(a) —Ec*(ct)= > 0.
The surplus on trade account is balanced by a deficit on service account.
Ex post trade flows will vary across states of nature. The expected trade
pattern is, however, neutral, and clearly is not determined by initial relative— 21—
factorabundance. This is similar to the result reported by Svensson (1982),
who found in a different context that trade in goods might not be explainable
by autarky relative factor abundance when factors are internationally mobile.
Proposition 6: Suppose O(ci) and e*(cz) arc symmetrically distributed and
K/L =K*/L*.(i) If the good whose technology is uncertain is relatively capital
intensive, then capital moves toward the smaller country, the smaller country has
positive expected exports of both goods, and has greater relative expected exports
of the good whose technology is uncertain than it has relative expected consumption
of that good. (ii) If the good whose technology is uncertain is relatively labor
intensive, then capital moves toward the larger country, the smaller country has
positive expected exports of the good whose technology is uncertain and has positive
expected imports of the other goode
Proof: The proof makes use of Figure 3, and the fact that, in an incomplete—spec-
ialization equilibrium, Z =Z.(Assume, for definiteness, that the home country
is larger.) In each panel of the figure, we illustrate the real—equity production
possibility frontiers (EPPF) for the two countries under autarky. Since relative
factor endowments are equal, the EPPF for the larger country is a radial expansion
of the EPPF for the smaller country.
Consider the hypothetical real—equity production that would take place in each
country at the relative equity prices that prevail in the equilibrium with free
capital movements, were actual capital movements to be zero. These points are
marked B and B* in each panel of the figure. Clearly, the absence of capital
movements is inconsistent with equilibrium, since at these points, Z >Z.
Now suppose that the industry with uncertain technology is relatively capital
intensive (see panel a). Imagine a transfer of capital from the home to the
foreign country, holding the relative equity prices constant at their equilibrium— 22—
values.This would cause the two countries to move in opposite directions along
their respective capital—Rybczynski lines, BR and B*R*J3 These Rybczynski
lines are parallel, because the equality of relative equity prices in equilibrium
implies that factor prices are equal for this hypothetical transfer. Eventually,
points E and E* are reached, such that Z =Z'.These real—equity production
points are consistent with full equilibrium.
In panel b, the industry with uncertain technology is assumed to be labor
intensive. Then, equalization across countries of the real—equity outputs of
industry 1 requires a transfer of capital from the small country to the large
country1 The equilibrium production points are at F and F*.It is perhaps
counterintuitive that capital moves in this case toward the larger country, even
though factor endowment ratios are equal and country risks are symmetric. This
direction of capital movement is dictated by the strong implications of the
Rybczynski theorem for the output effects of endowment changes.
Consider, finally, the pattern of (expected) ex post commodity trade. Expected
exports by the foreign country of the product of the product of the uncertain
industry are
—Ec*(cz)=Ac*(c)/2>0,
The foreign country has exports of good 2 given by
*_(l+X)Y*_Y
2+A
Referring once again to Figure 3, note that in each panel the output of the equity
of industry 2 at point B is 1 + A times as large as the output of this equity
at point B*.It follows that, in equilibrium, the smaller country has positive— 23—
exportsof good 2 if the production of this good is relatively labor intensive
and positive imports otherwise. When the small country is an expected exporter
of both goods, its relative expected export levels can be compared to its relative
expected consumption levels. In this case,
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* * * EX(a) —Ec(a) Ec(a)
Once again, the pattern of (expected) commodity trade is not predicted by
initial relative factor abundance.
V. Conclusions
Whenproduction is characterized by technological uncertainty that is,
at leastto some extent, country specific, the international allocation of mobile
factors is influenced by the asset preferences of risk averse consumer—investors.
In this paper, we have studied the determinants of the direction of international
capital movements In a model of trade in commodities and real equities, under the
assumption that preferences over commodities and assets are identical and homothetic
worldwide. In a one—good variant of our model which is in the spirit of MacDougall
(1960), we found that physical capital flows in an uncertain world are subject
to the combined influences of relative factor abundance, relative size of labor
force and relative country riskiness. When deviation from complete symmetry is
along only one of these dimensions, capital moves toward the relatively labor— 24—
abundantcountry, the smaller country and the less risky country, respectively.
However, in more general situations, the interaction between these effects can
be quite complex.
Many of the lessons from the MacIougall model remain applicable when the
model is extended to incorporate a second good that is produced in each country with
a nonstochastic technology. In contrast to the deterministic two—good, two—
factor model with potential capital mobility, equilibrium under uncertainty gen-
erally requires some movement of capital even when goods are freely traded.
Relative factor abundance, relative size of labor force and relative country risk-
iness still play important roles in the determination of the direction of factor
movements, as well as in the determination of the expected pattern of commodity
trade. An additional insight gained from the two—good variant is that the direction
of physical capital flow may hinge on the identity of the factor which is used
intensively in the industry with random technology.— 25—
Footnotes
1.Helpman and Razin (l978a, 1978b) have asserted that comparative labor costs
explain the pattern of trade in securities in a Ricardian—type model with
uncertainty. However, their argument is incoiplete, and requires for its
validity certain restrictions on the distribution of the random variables
and on utility functions, of the sort imposed by Anderson (1981) in his
proofs of the Heckscher—Ohlin and Travis—Vanek theorems under uncertainty.
2.Note that Helpman and Razin (l978b, p. 248) were mistaken when they claimed
that, generally, "trade in goods and securities does substitute for factor
movements". The issue is clarified in their later discussion (l978a), where
they recognized that factor price equalization in their model requires that
the industry—specific shocks be perfectly correlated across countries.
3. We use asterisks to refer to variables for the foreign country,
4.Anderson (1981) was the first to recognize the relevance of this assumption
in the context of the Helpman—Razin model of trade in goods and securities.
When, in Section IV, we introduce a second good, our assumption will be that
preferences over goods are identical and homethetic as well.
5. In other words, we suppose for the sake of the diagram, that the joint density
function for the two random variables, Y(.,..) satisfies 'Y(O,e*) tII(O*,O),
6. See Rothchild and Stiglitz (1970).
7. Similarly, goods trade need not emerge if the initial situation is one of
free capital movements. As Nundell has shown, this implies that any tariff
on goods will be prohibitive when capital is internationally mobile, pro—
vded that a sItuatIon of incomplete specialization is consistent with equil—
lb r ium.
8.Note that the return to a unit of real equity is B(a)p(a) for a firm in the
home industry 1, and is O*(o)p(cz) for a firm in the foreign industry 1.
A unit of real equity for a firm in industry 2 irrespective of location, Days
a return of one unit of the numeraire good.
9.The uniqueness of equilibrium can be demonstrated as follows. Recall that
with identical homethetic asset and commodity preferences all agents demands
are aggregable. Let c(a) and c(ct) be the aggregate world consumption
levels. The laissez—faire market equilibrium has, in this case, the property
that it is the solution to a social planner's problem of the form
max EU[c(ct), T(c,)1
subject to c(o) < O(c)F(L, I(s) + O*(ct)F(L*, K*);
e*()c(r, K) + O*(a)G( -L*,
K;);
and
K +K*+K +K*<K+K* x x yy—— 26—
9. (continued)
The constraint set for this problem is weakly convex (i.e. it has flat sections
for the reasons identified by Mundell). However, if U(,.) exhibits risk
aversion, and O(c) and O*(cz) are less—than--perfectly correlated, the ob-
jective function is strictly concave, and thus the solution must be unique.
10. The condition =2(Y+ Y*)/(Z + Z*) is implied by asset—market clearance,
given that Z =Z*.
11.Note that the existence of free capital movement and free trade in equities
implies, in an incomplete—specialization equilibrium, that wage rates are
equalized. Also, in equilibrium, the value of initial stock holdings is
zero (see Helpman and Razin, l978a, Ch. 4).
12.Rearrangement of the ex post market clearing condition for good 2 gives:
Y —c*(a)[(1 + X)Y* —YJ/(2+ X).Thus, the volume of trade in good 2
is actually state—independent.
13. Helpman and Razin (l978a, l978b) have shown that the Rybczynski theorem is
applicable to real equity outputs when securities are internationally traded.
/— 27—
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